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 An oil painting caught and held him.!.!.!. There was beauty, and it drew him 
irresistibly. He forgot his awkward walk and came closer to the painting, 
very close. The beauty faded out of the canvas. His face expressed his bepuz-
zlement. He stared at what seemed a careless daub of paint, then stepped 
away. Immediately all the beauty flashed back into the canvas. ‘A trick pic-
ture’, was his thought .!.!. 
 —Jack London,  Martin Eden (1909/1982) 
 1. Introduction 
 A picture is a marked or otherwise patterned, two-dimensional (2D) surface 
that, when present to sight, elicits the experience as of an absent, three-
dimensionally (3D) organized scene. 1 How ought we to understand the 
nature of this experience? There are a number of distinct suggestions in the 
philosophical literature: 
 A. Pictures elicit a 3D-scene-representing experience of the same psycholog-
ical kind as the experience of seeing face-to-face (Gombrich 1961/2000, 
1972, 1982; Briscoe 2016). Since the represented, 3D scene is absent 
from sight, however, this experience is non-veridical. 
 B. When we look at a picture, we enjoy an experience as of the depicted, 
3D scene. This experience, however, is always fused with awareness of 
the superficial pattern on the pictorial surface (Wollheim 1987, 1998, 
2003). In this respect, pictorial experience has two different dimensions 
or ‘folds’ of representational content. 
 Accounts (A) and (B) maintain that the appearance of depth and 3D struc-
ture ‘beyond’ the 2D pictorial surface is essential to pictorial experience. 
When we look at a suitably patterned surface, Richard Wollheim writes, 
we are typically aware of ‘something in front of or behind something else’ 
(1998: 221). As John Kulvicki puts it, ‘there is a strong sense in which 
depicted scenes seem to recede from the canvas’ (2009: 391). Other promi-
nent accounts, by contrast, attach theoretical priority to seeing properties 
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of the pattern or design visible  on the pictorial surface. They agree with 
Malcolm Budd that 
 the way to capture the experience of seeing a picture as a depiction of its 
subject is not by adding any other visual experience to the visual aware-
ness of the picture-surface—either as a separate experience or by fusing 
it with the visual awareness of the picture-surface—but by specifying 
the nature of the visual awareness of the picture-surface when you see 
what the picture depicts. 
 (1992/2008: 203–204) 
 There are two familiar approaches to characterizing the nature of this 
surface-awareness: 
 C. To experience a 3D scene in a picture’s surface is to see the latter as resem-
bling the former in certain respects (Budd 1992/2008, 1993/2008; Hop-
kins 1998, 2006). For example, to experience a cubical object oriented in 
depth when looking at a drawing of the Necker cube is to see the pattern 
of lines that make up the drawing as resembling such an object. 
 D. Pictures function as props in ‘visual games of make-believe’ (Walton 
1990, 2008). In looking at a picture, the viewer imagines of her experi-
ence that it is a seeing of whatever the picture portrays. ‘In the case of 
picture perception, not only does looking at the picture induce us to 
imagine seeing an ox, we also imagine our actual visual experience, our 
perceiving the relevant part of the canvas, to be an experience of seeing 
an ox’ (Walton 2008: 118). 2 
 In the philosophy of art, E. H. Gombrich is by far the best-known proponent 
of option (A), according to which pictorial experience is psychologically 
continuous with the experience of seeing face-to-face. Pictures, Gombrich 
says, have the power to arouse in us a ‘visual experience of a kind that we 
know from our encounters with reality’ (1982: 181). In what follows, I will 
refer to this view as the  Continuity Hypothesis . 
 The Continuity Hypothesis comprises three main claims. First, a picture 
is a patterned, 2D surface designed to elicit a non-veridical experience as of 
depth and 3D structure—‘something akin’, as Gombrich puts it, ‘to a visual 
hallucination’ (1972: 208). Crucially, this hallucination-like experience rep-
resents its intentional objects as located on the far side, as it were, of the 
patterned, pictorial surface. Gombrich, as we have already seen, is not alone 
in characterizing the spatial phenomenal character of pictorial experience in 
this way. ‘The first intention of the painter’, Leonardo da Vinci tells us in his 
 Treatise on Painting , ‘is to make a flat surface display a body as if modeled 
and separate from this plane’ (quoted by Kemp 1989: 15). A picture, as J. J. 
Gibson puts it, ‘is both a scene and a surface, and the scene is paradoxically 
 behind the surface’ (1979: 281). When we look at  The Peasant Wedding 
( Figure 3.1 ), for example, we do not merely perceive an array of colours 
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located on a single plane of depth. We also experience a complexly orga-
nized, 3D scene in which voluminous objects participate in a ‘recessional 
movement’, to borrow Wölfflin’s (1929) phrase, from the pictorial point 
of view. Following standard usage in art history, aesthetics, and perceptual 
psychology, I will refer to the virtual, 3D space in which we visually experi-
ence shapes, sizes, colours, textures, orientations, and other features when 
we look at a picture as  pictorial space (Wölfflin 1929; White 1967; Pirenne 
1970; Kubovy 1986; Rogers 1995, 2003; Koenderink 1998, 2012; Hecht 
 et!al . 2003; Thompson  et al . 2011: ch. 12). 
 The second claim is that phenomenological and representational continu-
ities between pictorial experience and seeing face-to-face reflect their under-
lying, psychological continuity. Both experiences result, Gombrich says, 
from an unconscious, inference-like process of ‘guided projection’. 
 On the one hand, the process is said to be  guided because it relies on 
certain nonconscious expectations and assumptions about the structure of 
the visible environment in order to interpret the message conveyed by the 
retinal image. These assumptions perform two closely related functions: 
they are used by the perceptual system to generate a ‘hypothesis’ about the 
most probable cause of the image in the distal environment and, in addition, 
to test that hypothesis by generating predictions concerning, among other 
things, the sensory effects of bodily movement: ‘every message sets up a set 
Figure 3.1 Pieter Bruegel the Elder, The Peasant Wedding (1567)
Oil on panel, 124 cm " 164 cm, Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum.
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of expectations with which the incoming flow can be matched to confirm 
correct assessments or to modify and knock out false guesses’ (Gombrich 
1978: 158; see also 1961/2000: 274–275). Gombrich refers to the contri-
bution of these background assumptions to perception as the ‘beholder’s 
share’. 
 On the other hand, the process is said to involve  projection because its 
conscious end product is underdetermined by the structure of the light sam-
pled by the eye. A given retinal image could be caused by the light reflected 
from (or emitted by) many different 3D scenes. (This is the so-called inverse 
optics problem in vision science.) Contemporary Bayesian ‘predictive cod-
ing’ models of visual processing replace talk of implicit assumptions with 
talk of prior probabilities and likelihoods (for discussion, see Hohwy 2013; 
Clark 2015; Rescorla 2015), but in other key respects, they bear strong 
affinities to the Gombrichian account. On both approaches, 
 perception is a process .!.!. in which we (or rather, various parts of our 
brains), try to guess what is out there, using the incoming sensory signal 
more as a means of tuning and nuancing the guessing rather than as a 
rich .!.!. encoding of the state of the world. 
 (Clark 2015: 27) 
 The following passage from  Art and Illusion so perfectly captures the kin-
ship between the Gombrichian account of perception and the more recent 
predictive coding framework that it is worth quoting at length: 
 The experience of the radio ‘monitor’ confronted with indistinct speech 
and that of the sailor confronted with indistinct shapes on the hori-
zon are not incommensurate. We must always rely on guesses, on the 
assessment of probabilities, and on subsequent tests, and in this there 
is an even transition from the reading of the symbolic material to our 
reaction in real life. When we wait at the bus stop and hope the Num-
ber Two is coming into sight, we probe the indistinct blot that appears 
in the distance for the possibility of projecting the number ‘two’ into 
it. When we are successful in this projection, we say we now see the 
number. This is a case of symbol reading. But is it different with the 
bus itself? Certainly not on a foggy night. Nor even in full daylight, if 
the distance is sufficiently great. Every time we scan the distance we 
somehow compare our expectation, our projection, with the incoming 
message. If we are too keyed up, as is well known, the slightest stimulus 
will produce an illusion. Here as always it remains our task to keep our 
guesses flexible, to revise them if reality appears to contradict, and to try 
again for a hypothesis that might fit the data. But it is always we who 
send out these tentacles into the world around us, who grope and probe, 
ready to withdraw our feelers for a new test. 
 (Gombrich 1961/2000: 178–179) 
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 Like the predictive coding approach, the Gombrichian account of percep-
tion turns a traditional, input-dominated view of how vision works on its 
head. Visual experience is not a passive imprinting of the world on the mind 
but, rather, an active, hypothesis-generating, and hypothesis-testing percep-
tual process: ‘The world never presents a neutral picture to us; to become 
aware of it means to become aware of possible situations that we can try out 
to test for their validity’ (1961/2000: 275). 
 The central role of prediction and projection in perception is masked, 
Gombrich suggests, by the rapid, automatic, and seemingly effortless way in 
which the 3D structure of a visible scene is usually revealed to us. This point 
is illustrated in a discussion of a natural history engraving of some plants, 
insects, and animals displayed on an unstructured, white background: 
 Looking at Jacob Hoefnagel’s plate .!.!.!, we always supply the appropri-
ate ground to the figure: the lizard sits on a slope, while some insects, 
throwing shadows, are imagined against a flat ground and others are 
seen as flying. Without knowing it, we have carried out a rapid succes-
sion of tests for consistency and settled on those readings which make 
sense. 
 (1961/2000: 231) 
 The pictorial arts, as this passage makes clear, provide an especially useful 
arena for probing the role of the beholder’s share in perception. The infor-
mation in the light available to the eye, as Gombrich emphasizes, is ‘immea-
surably richer .! .! . when we move around in the real world’ (1961/2000: 
274) than when viewing an etching, drawing, or painting of a 3D scene. In 
consequence, pictures afford special opportunities for teasing out the rela-
tive contributions of ‘top-down’ projection and the ‘bottom-up’ sensory sig-
nal to perceptual processing. The more ambiguous or incomplete the signal 
from the environment, the more prominent the role played by the behold-
er’s share in the process of visual hypothesis formation. ‘The deliberately 
blurred image, the  sfumato , or veiled form .!.!.’, for example, ‘cuts down the 
information on a canvas and thereby stimulates the mechanism of projec-
tion’ (1961/2000: 175–176). 
 Finally, it is central to Gombrich’s project in  Art and Illusion that the 
ambiguity of the environment’s image on the retina ‘can never be seen as 
such’ (1961/2000: 249). The visual system selects only one consistent, 
3D-scene interpretation of the image at a time, even when more than one 
such interpretation can be made to ‘fit’. 3 In support of this claim, Gombrich 
appeals to ambiguous or ‘multistable’ figures in which figure-ground assign-
ments, shapes, orientations, groupings, or other organizational properties 
appear to alternate with prolonged inspection. Whether side  abcd or side 
 efgh appears closer in depth varies from one moment to the next, when we 
look at a drawing of the Necker cube ( Figure 3.2 ), but we never experi-
ence both organizations at once. The neuroscientists David Leopold and 
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Figure 3.2 Ambiguous figures: the Necker cube and the duck–rabbit
Nikos Logothetis refer to this familiar property of multistable perception 
as ‘exclusivity’: 
 Exclusivity, or uniqueness, ensures that conflicting visual representations 
are never simultaneously present [in conscious awareness]. That only a 
single perceptual solution can exist at once is likely to have its origins 
in the structure of the sensory machinery itself; that is, uniqueness is a 
fundamental encoding principle among neurons in the visual cortex. 
 (Leopold and Logothetis 1999: 260) 
 Gombrich argues that the exclusivity of visual processing—the requirement 
of a single, consistent, 3D scene interpretation—has important implications 
for understanding the nature of pictorial experience. When an observer 
looks at  The Peasant Wedding ( Figure 3.1 ), for example, two conflicting 
sets of depth cues are typically available to her visual system. At close range, 
binocular disparity, convergence, and accommodation specify the orienta-
tion of the canvas and its distance in depth. The structured array of light 
reflected from the painting’s surface, however, is also a vehicle for sources of 
spatial information that jointly specify the layout and properties of objects 
in a (virtual) three-dimensionally organized scene. These monocular or ‘pic-
torial’ depth cues, as they are sometimes called, include, but are not limited 
to, occlusion, texture gradients, shadows, reflections, relative size, linear 
perspective, atmospheric haze, height in the visual field, and the horizon 
ratio (for useful reviews, see Ames 1925; Cutting and Vishton 1995; Palmer 
1999; and Thompson  et al . 2011). In consequence, a picture may elicit either 
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of two very different experiences: an experience that attributes properties to 
the patterned, 2D pictorial surface  or an experience that attributes proper-
ties to objects in phenomenally 3D pictorial space. We can look  at The Peas-
ant Wedding , or we can look  into it. 
 Gombrich argues that while it is possible to alternate or ‘switch’ between 
these different experiences, it isn’t possible to enjoy both of them at once: 
 But is it possible to ‘see’ both the plane surface and the battle horse at 
the same time? If we have been right so far, the demand is for the impos-
sible. To understand the battle horse is for a moment to disregard the 
plane surface. We cannot have it both ways. 
 (1961/2000: 279) 
 In this respect, Gombrich suggests, there is an analogy with the experience 
of looking at an ambiguous figure. Just as noticing the duck aspect in a 
drawing of the duck–rabbit ( Figure 3.2 ) excludes noticing the rabbit aspect 
at the same time, visually experiencing the pattern on an opaque, pictorial 
surface excludes visually experiencing the way objects are arranged ‘beyond’ 
that surface in pictorial space. In both cases, Gombrich suggests, ‘We are 
not aware of the ambiguity as such, but only the various interpretations.!.!.!. 
We can train ourselves to switch more rapidly, indeed to oscillate between 
readings, but we cannot hold conflicting interpretations’ (1961/2000: 236). 
 The now standard objection to this analogy is that while the two inter-
pretations in the first case (duck vs rabbit) do indeed genuinely conflict, the 
two interpretations in the second case (2D surface vs 3D scene) are merely 
 different . Richard Wollheim complains: 
 But by what right does Gombrich assume that we can no more see a pic-
ture as canvas and as nature, than we can see the duck-rabbit figure as a 
duck and as a rabbit? Because—it might be said—canvas and nature are 
different interpretations. But if this is Gombrich’s argument, it is clearly 
invalid. For we cannot see the duck-rabbit figure as duck and as rabbit, 
not because these are two different interpretations, but because they are 
two incompatible interpretations. 
 (Wollheim 1963: 29) 
 A similar objection has been voiced by Dominic Lopes: 
 the duck–rabbit figure undermines Gombrich’s intended use of it.!.!.!. 
Switches between the two contents (as of duck and rabbit respectively) 
are not analogous to switches between the figure’s design, on the one 
hand, and either of its contents, on the other. That duck cannot be 
seen simultaneously with rabbit fails to show that duck cannot be seen 
simultaneously with design or design simultaneously with rabbit. 
 (Lopes 2005: 31) 
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 My primary purpose in the remainder of this chapter is to clarify, develop, 
and defend the Gombrichian account of pictorial experience, drawing on 
resources from contemporary vision science. Section 2 provides motiva-
tion for Gombrich’s use of the duck–rabbit analogy by situating it in the 
context of his attack on a historically influential conception of the appear-
ance–reality distinction in visual perception. According to the conception 
in question, everyday visual experience comprises two distinct ‘layers’ or 
‘folds’ of representational content. The content of the first layer represents 
an object’s viewpoint-dependent appearance or ‘look’, where this is sup-
posed to be phenomenally flat or 2D in character. The content of the second 
layer, by contrast, is supposed to represent the object’s intrinsic, viewpoint-
independent properties as well as its distance in depth. Pictorial perception 
is arguably the best case for this ‘dual content’ theory of visual experience, 
since a picture really is a flat patchwork of colours that, when present to 
sight, elicits the impression of depth and 3D structure. One of Gombrich’s 
main aims in  Art and Illusion is to demonstrate that the theory fails even as 
an account of pictorial experience. 
 The dual content theory of pictorial experience is seemingly paradoxi-
cal. It maintains that when we look at a picture, the same solid angle in 
the visual field is represented  twice over —once as filled by an opaque, two-
dimensionally organized surface and once as containing a three-dimensionally 
organized scene.  Section 3 argues that two of the better-known attempts to 
eliminate the appearance of paradox at the heart of the dual content theory 
of pictorial experience are unsuccessful. The two putative layers of represen-
tational content in pictorial experience, it concludes, contrary to Wollheim, 
aren’t merely different. As Gombrich insists, they are also incompatible. 
 Section 4 defends and constructively elaborates on the Continuity Hypoth-
esis. In particular, it argues for an account of the structure of pictorial expe-
rience that I refer to as  weak onefoldness . Pictorial experience is onefold in 
the sense that its content reflects a single, consistent, 3D-scene interpretation 
of the retinal image. Pictorial experience is only weakly onefold, however, 
in that it typically attributes certain combinations of properties to the 2D 
pictorial surface and to objects in phenomenally 3D pictorial space at the 
same time. Having the experience of virtual depth and 3D structure, when 
looking at a picture, I argue, excludes representing some, but not  all , of a 
picture’s surface properties. 
 A second aim of section 4 is to reconcile the claim that pictorial experi-
ence and seeing face-to-face are psychologically continuous with the obser-
vation that the former experience does not typically dispose the perceiver to 
believe that its objects are real. A recent account of  stereopsis from Dhanraj 
Vishwanath (2014), I propose, makes such reconciliation possible. Accord-
ing to Vishwanath, pictorial experience does not dispose the perceiver to 
believe that its objects are present to sight because, in contrast with ordi-
nary, non-pictorial visual experience, it fails to specify their locations at cer-
tain absolutely scaled distances in depth. This contrast, I argue, however, 
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is best understood as a difference at the level of representational content 
rather than a difference at the level of psychological kind. 
 2. Pictorial Experience and the Denial of Dual Awareness 
 Gombrich, as we have seen, denies that it is psychologically possible to 
experience the properties of the pattern visible  on a 2D pictorial surface, 
while simultaneously experiencing depth and 3D structure  in that surface. 
These two interpretations or ‘readings’ both fit the configuration of light 
intensities on the retina but are mutually exclusive. This view is central to 
argument of  Art and Illusion . Gombrich goes so far as to identify our inabil-
ity to experience the ambiguity of the incoming retinal signal as the ‘theme 
song’ of the book (1961/2000: 313). 
 Gombrich, it is important to emphasize, doesn’t just reject a dual content 
theory of pictorial experience. He also rejects of a dual content theory of 
ordinary, non-pictorial seeing. The primary target of Gombrich’s criticism 
in  Art and Illusion is, in fact, a historically influential conception of the 
appearance-reality distinction in everyday visual perception and its applica-
tion to the special case of perceiving pictures. 
 According to the conception in question, the representational content of 
visual experience divides into two ‘layers’. The first, putative layer of visual 
content represents the viewpoint-dependent appearance or ‘look’ of a per-
ceived object, where this is supposed to be phenomenally 2D in character, 
much like a flat projection of the object’s shape on the frontal plane. In 
addition, the first layer of content is frequently alleged to be phenomeno-
logically, epistemically, and/or developmentally more basic than the second 
layer. 4 ‘What we really see’, according to one prominent version of the dual 
content theory, ‘is a medley of colored patches such as Turner paints’ (Gom-
brich 1961/2000: 296). The 19th-century art critic John Ruskin provides 
an especially clear expression of this outlook in  The Elements of Drawing : 
 The perception of solid Form is entirely a matter of experience. We  see 
nothing but flat colours.! .! .! . The whole technical power of painting 
depends on our recovery of what might be called the innocence of the 
eye; that is to say, of a sort of childish perception of these flat stains of 
colour, merely as such, without consciousness of what they signify—as 
a blind man would see them if suddenly gifted with sight. 
 (Ruskin 1856/1971: 27) 5 
 The second, putative layer of visual content, by contrast, is supposed to rep-
resent an object’s intrinsic, viewpoint-independent properties as well as its 
distance and orientation in depth. It results from the application of percep-
tual constancy mechanisms, spatial organizational principles, and learned 
associations to the content of the first layer. Gombrich variously associates 
versions of this dual content theory of visual experience with the British 
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Empiricist tradition in philosophy, the introspectionist movement in psy-
chology, and Impressionism’s ‘discovery of appearances’ (Fry 1934). 
 The dual content of theory of visual experience is not just a historical 
curiosity. Contemporary advocates in philosophy include William Lycan 
(1996, 2008), Jonathan Cohen (2010), and Berit Brogaard (2012). Perhaps 
the most influential recent proponent of the theory, however, is Alva Noë 
(2004, 2005): 
 Perceptual constancy—size and shape constancy—coexists with per-
spectival  nonconstancy . Two tomatoes, at different distances from us, 
may visibly differ in their apparent size even as we plainly see their 
sameness of size; a silver dollar may look elliptical—when we view it 
from an angle, or when it is tilted in respect of us—even though it also 
looks, plainly, circular. 
 Perceptual experience presents us with the world (the constancies) 
and it presents us with how the world perceptually seems to be (the 
nonconstancies). A satisfying account of perception must explain how 
the silver dollar can look both circular and elliptical, how the tomatoes 
can look to be the same in size and yet different in size. Perceptual expe-
rience is two-dimensional, and this needs explaining .
 (Noë 2005: 235) 
 Noë identifies an object’s non-constant, visually apparent shape with the 
shape of the patch that would perfectly occlude the object on a plane per-
pendicular to the line of sight. He refers to this as the object’s ‘perspectival 
shape’ (P-shape). An object’s non-constant, ‘perspectival size’ (P-size), in 
turn, corresponds to the size of the patch that would occlude the object on 
the same plane. Non-constant P-properties are ‘perceptually basic’ (2004: 
81), according to Noë, because in order to see an object’s constant spa-
tial properties it is necessary both to experience its P-properties and to 
understand how these would undergo transformation across changes in 
one’s point of view. Seeing is thus a ‘two-step’ process: ‘How they (merely) 
appear to be plus sensorimotor knowledge gives you things as they are’ 
(Noë 2004: 164). 
 Although we typically attend to the content of the second, post-constancy 
layer in our everyday interactions, the content of the first layer, according 
to dual content theorists, is supposed to remain introspectively accessible, 
if only we know how to look for it. ‘There is a sense .!.!.’, Noë writes, ‘in 
which we move about in a sea of perspectival properties and we are aware 
of them (usually without thought or notice) whenever we are perceptually 
conscious. Indeed, to be perceptually conscious is to be aware of them’ (Noë 
2004: 167). We normally attend to the circular shape of an obliquely viewed 
coin, but this doesn’t mean that it ceases to look elliptical when we do. As 
paradoxical as it may sound, a silver dollar can look circular and elliptical 
at the same time. 
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 The Gestalt psychologists referred to the assumption that pre-constancy 
visual appearances co-exist alongside our post-constancy representations of 
the world as the doctrine of ‘unnoticed sensations’ (Köhler 1913/1971). In 
 The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception , J. J. Gibson characterizes this 
doctrine in following way: 
 It has been generally believed that even adults can become conscious 
of their visual sensations if they try. You have to take an introspec-
tive attitude, or analyze your experience into its elements, or pay atten-
tion to the data of your perception, or stare at something persistently 
until the meaning fades away. I once believed it myself. I suggested that 
the ‘visual field’ could be attended to, as distinguished from the ‘visual 
world’, and that it was almost a flat patchwork of colors, like a painting 
on a plane surface facing the eye .!.!. 
 (Gibson 1979: 286) 
 Using Gibson’s terminology, the first layer of visual representational con-
tent posited by the dual content theory represents the structure of the two-
dimensionally organized visual field, while the content of the second layer 
represents the layout of the three-dimensionally organized visual world. 
 Gombrich, like Gibson, is deeply sceptical of the doctrine of unnoticed 
sensations. Perceptual constancy mechanisms, he argues, do not operate on 
a platform of conscious, but normally inconspicuous, 2D appearances or 
P-properties. The first, introspectively accessible product of sub-personal, 
perceptual information processing is an experience that represents the dis-
position and properties of objects in the 3D visual world. Gombrich writes: 
 Presented with a circular disk, for instance, we are well aware of the fact 
that it might be fairly large and far away, or small and close by. We also 
may remember intellectually that it might be a tilted ellipse, or a number 
of other shapes, but we cannot possibly see these infinite possibilities; the 
disk will appear to us as an object out there, even though we may real-
ize, as students of perception, that another person may guess differently. 
 One must have experienced these effects to realize how elusive they 
make the idea of ‘appearance’ as distinct from the object itself. The 
stimulus school of psychology and the phenomenalists talked as if the 
‘appearance’ of the disk, the stimulus pattern, were the only thing really 
‘experienced’ while all the rest was inference, interpretation. It sounds 
like a plausible description of vision, but it is untrue to our actual expe-
rience. We do not observe the appearance of color patches and then pro-
ceed to interpret their meaning.!.!.!. To see is to see ‘something out there’. 
 (Gombrich 1961/2000: 260) 
 It is even harder to see the world as a two-dimensional field than it is 
to see one’s own image on the mirror’s surface. Our belief that we can 
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ever make the world dissolve into such a flat patchwork of colors rests 
itself on an illusion .!.!. 
 It is to the three-dimensional world that our organism is attuned, 
where it learns to test its anticipations against the flow of incoming 
stimuli. . . . 
 (Gombrich 1961/2000: 328–329) 
 Ruskin’s ‘flat stains of color’ and Noë’s P-properties, on this view, are not a 
foundational, pre-constancy layer of conscious experience on which a fur-
ther layer of post-constancy, visual representational content is constructed. 
Instead, perceptual processing begins with texture gradients, edge junctions, 
and other properties of the retinal image that are predictive of properties 
in the environment and, on this nonconscious evidential basis, constructs a 
representation of the most probable, three-dimensionally organized scene—
a ‘possible configuration in space and light’ (Gombrich 1961/2000: 327). 
Conscious visual experience, in other words, begins only after perceptual 
constancy mechanisms and Gestalt organizational principles have done their 
work, that is, with the Gibsonian visual world as opposed to the Gibsonian 
visual field (Briscoe 2008). The eye is never innocent in Ruskin’s sense. 
 The Gombrichian account, as already observed, has a close counterpart 
in contemporary vision science. The central challenge faced by the visual 
system, according to recent Bayesian models of perception (for overviews, 
see Knill and Richards 1996; Mamassian  et al . 2002; Clark 2013, 2015; 
Hohwy 2013; Rescorla 2015), is to infer the most probable cause of the 
retinal image on the basis of two sources of ‘evidence’: (1) the various depth 
cues present in the image itself, as well as (2) learned or innate assumptions 
about the statistical properties of the natural environment and the image 
formation process. The content of the perceptual state formed in response to 
a particular pattern of retinal stimulation—the brain’s operative ‘hypothe-
sis’ about the structure of the impinging environment—is the cause to which 
the highest probability is assigned given all the available endogenous and 
exogenous evidence. In general, this will be one of many different possible 
three-dimensionally organized scenes: the  hypothesis space for causal infer-
ence in vision is a 3D-scene space, in which different hypotheses correspond 
to different possible arrays of objects at a distance from the perceiver’s eyes. 6 
(One such hypothesis picks out the very scene in front of the reader now.) 
Crucially, each interpretation of the retinal image contained in the hypoth-
esis space for vision is a  post-constancy interpretation. Interpretations in the 
hypothesis space for vision, this is to say, range over possible states of the 
Gibsonian visual world rather than Gibsonian visual field. 7 To see is always 
to see, as Gombrich says, ‘something out there’. 
 Neither Gombrich nor Gibson would deny, of course, that there are 
contexts in which an observer will experience an obliquely viewed disk as 
an ellipse in the frontal plane. When the disk is poorly illuminated, or far 
away, or seen under experimentally contrived ‘reduced cue’ conditions, such 
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non-veridical perception is entirely possible. It seems clear, however, that 
the possibility of visual illusion under informationally impoverished view-
ing conditions by itself provides no support for the dual content theorist’s 
claims about the way the world appears to us under normal, informationally 
rich viewing conditions (Briscoe 2008; Hopp 2013). No more, say, than the 
possibility of mistaking Sarah Palin for Hillary Clinton on a dark night pro-
vides support for the claim that Palin looks like Clinton in broad daylight. 
 For present purposes, there are three important points. First, that a disk 
may look elliptical in the contexts mentioned in the last paragraph does no 
work when it comes to motivating the claim that there is a conscious, pre-
constancy layer of perceptual representational content. On the contrary, the 
non-veridical,  ellipse-in-the-frontal-plane interpretation of the retinal image 
 is a post-constancy interpretation, in particular, the post-constancy interpre-
tation that is most probable in light of the (meagre) information available 
to the visual system. The disk appears to be intrinsically elliptical in shape—
full stop. There is just one layer of post-constancy, visual representational 
content. 
 Second, the two interpretations, viz.,  disk-slanted-in-depth and  ellipse-in-
the-frontal-plane , are clearly incompatible. A single, opaque surface cannot 
look to be intrinsically circular and slanted in depth and intrinsically ellipti-
cal and at a right angle to the line of sight at the same time (or at different 
times, holding sources of optical information and viewing conditions fixed). 
 Finally, far from having a developmentally, phenomenologically, or epis-
temically privileged status, the elliptical appearance, in this context, is simply 
evidence of a breakdown in perceptual constancy. Veridical shape perception 
is not guaranteed when the visual system operates outside of information-
rich, ecologically normal viewing conditions. The real contrast between the 
two interpretations of the retinal image, in short, is not that only one of them 
is ‘innocent’ but, rather, that only one of them also is accurate. 
 Recent empirical work on the role of depth in perceptual organization is 
helpful for purposes of further elucidating Gombrich’s view. Roland Flem-
ing and Barton Anderson (2004) divide ‘legal interpretations’ of a luminance 
edge in the retinal image into two main classes. Interpretations in the first 
class represent a  surface event in which both sides  x and  y of the edge  are 
located at the same distance in depth from the perceiver. Examples include 
reflectance edges, cast shadows, and creases on a single, opaque surface. 
Interpretations in the second class represent the contour of a background-
occluding object and, hence, a difference in depth at the edge: one side of 
the edge, either  x or  y , is located at the depth of the object while the other 
side of the edge lies at the more distant depth of the partially occluded back-
ground (Fleming and Anderson 2004: 1287). In this case, the edge is said to 
be ‘owned’ by the object (Nakayama  et al . 1995). 
 In terms of this framework, Gombrich’s view is that, when looking at a 
picture, the visual system cannot legally interpret a given edge or set of edges 
in the retinal image in both ways at the same time. What the visual system 
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can do, he suggests, is alternate or switch between a ‘surface event’ interpre-
tation of an edge and an ‘object contour’ interpretation of the edge. These 
different interpretations do not correspond to different, simultaneously 
accessible layers of content in one’s experience of the picture but, rather, to 
two, temporally distinct experiences. 
 An analogous Gombrichian claim holds for how we experience non-spatial 
properties, such as lightness (albedo) and colour, when looking at a picture. 
Consider the lightness illusion by Barton Anderson and Jon Winawer (2005) 
reproduced in  Figure 3.3 . In the figure, the disks on the light and dark sur-
rounds are photometrically identical, but the disks on the light surround 
appear as uniformly black objects visible behind a semi-transparent, light 
haze, whereas the disks on the dark surround appear as uniformly white 
objects visible behind a semi-transparent, dark haze. This illusion, Anderson 
and Winawer propose, is caused by photometric and geometric relationships 
in the figure that modulate the (non-veridical) perception of  transparency 
inside the disk regions: whether a given disk in the demonstration looks 
white or black depends on the way the visual system uses these relationships 
for purposes of decomposing the contrasting luminances that define the tex-
ture inside the disk into surfaces or layers at different distances in (virtual) 
depth. In consequence, it is not possible to experience the lightness illusion, 
while simultaneously experiencing the disks as textured patches on a 2D 
surface, that is, as  co-planar with their surround. 
 Similar remarks can be made with respect to the apparent colours of 
objects in pictorial space across different virtual illumination conditions. 
Consider a variant of Dales Purves and Beau Lotto’s Rubik’s cube colour 
illusion, in which one cube appears to be lit by a yellow light source and the 
Figure 3.3 Lightness illusion
Reproduced with permission from Anderson and Winawer (2005).
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other by a blue light source (Purves  et al . 2002: 241). 8 What is surprising, 
when we look at the image, is that although some tiles on the top side of 
the first cube look blue and some tiles on the top side of the second cube 
look yellow, the corresponding regions on the pictorial surface are physi-
cally identical. Indeed, they are precisely the same shade of grey. This is 
perceptually evident when a mask is superimposed upon the demonstra-
tion, covering the other tiles. The key observation, in the present context, is 
not just that context affects colour constancy in both physical and pictorial 
space (Azzouni 2013: 91), but that experiencing the colours of the tiles in 
phenomenally 3D pictorial space as chromatically different (yellow vs blue) 
excludes seeing the regions on the 2D pictorial surface in which the tiles are 
displayed as chromatically identical (grey). It is not possible to enjoy both 
experiences at the same time. The reader is invited to give it a try! 9 
 Critics of the dual content theory have sometimes charged its adherents 
with over-analogizing everyday visual experience to looking at paintings, 
photographs, and other flat media (Gibson 1979; Smith 2000; Schwitzgebel 
2006; Briscoe 2008; Snowdon 2015). Nevertheless, the best case for the 
dual content theory, it might be thought, is the experience of looking at a 
picture. For one thing, a picture really  is a flat patchwork of colours that, 
when present to sight, elicits the experience as of depth and 3D structure. In 
addition, it is not clear that criticisms of the dual content theory of everyday 
visual experience canvassed above straightforwardly apply to a dual content 
theory of pictorial experience. Indeed, there are two disanalogies between 
the experience of looking at a voluminous object ‘in the flesh’ and the expe-
rience of looking at an image of such an object that arguably make a dual 
content theory of pictorial experience more promising. 
 The first disanalogy concerns the different kinds of optical information 
available to the visual system when viewing pictures and real-world scenes, 
respectively. In most cases, sources of information concerning the layout of a 
real-world scene are rich and consistent enough to support the selection of a 
single interpretation from the hypothesis space for vision. This explains why 
it is not possible, holding sources of optical information fixed, to switch 
from a  disk-slanted-in-depth interpretation of the retinal image to an  ellipse-
in-the-frontal-plane interpretation in the above example. (In contemporary 
Bayesian parlance, although both interpretations or hypotheses may have 
roughly the same prior probability, binocular disparity, texture gradients, 
vergence cues, and other sources of sensory evidence make one interpreta-
tion much more  likely than the other, and this means that it will be assigned 
a proportionately higher posterior probability.) 
 When you look at a picture, by contrast, two conflicting sets of depth 
cues are typically present in the light reflected (or emitted) to your eye. The 
first set of cues, as already mentioned, includes sources of optical informa-
tion that enable your visual system accurately to recover the properties of 
the opaque, 2D pictorial surface. When you look at  The Peasant Wedding 
( Figure 3.1 ), for example, there is ‘surface event’ information that specifies 
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the colours and elliptical shapes of the patches of paint that Bruegel used to 
depict some dishes of food in the bottom-right quadrant of the canvas. The 
second set of cues, by contrast, includes sources of monocular spatial infor-
mation that support the experience as of depth and 3D structure in pictorial 
space. For example, when viewing Bruegel’s painting, there is information 
that specifies the voluminous shapes, relative sizes, and orientations of the 
virtual objects that are intended to resemble dishes. Since there is ample 
information for both of these 3D-scene-interpretations when you look at the 
painting, it could be argued that both interpretations may be simultaneously 
reflected in the content of your experience. 
 There is a second point of disanalogy. One objection to the dual content 
theory, as we saw, had to do with the fact that it allows for simultaneous 
attribution of incompatible determinates of the same determinable to the 
same object. A disk viewed at an oblique angle is supposed to look both  cir-
cular and  elliptical as well as both  tilted and  upright at the same time. This 
is what Charles Siewert calls the ‘Problem of Contradictory Visual Appear-
ances’ (Siewert 2006: 5). Matters are rather different, it could be argued, 
when looking at a picture. Here, one interpretation of the retinal image 
( I 1 ) attributes certain properties to the 2D pictorial surface, while the other 
interpretation ( I 2 ) attributes certain properties to a virtual object in phe-
nomenally 3D pictorial space. In terms of feature-binding theory (Treisman 
1996), different features are bound to the surface in  I 1 than are bound to 
the object of pictorial experience in  I 2 . So there is no contradiction internal 
to the content of an experience that simultaneously reflects both  I 1 and  I 2 . 
 How might a Gombrichian respond? With respect to the first putative dis-
analogy, it is important to observe that there are contexts in which the sources 
of optical information in the light received from a real-world scene are highly 
ambiguous, even when the constraining assumptions of the ‘beholder’s share’ 
are brought to bear on its uptake. In Bayes-speak, there are real-world con-
texts in which different visual hypotheses have about the same posterior prob-
ability. For example, just as it is possible to experience a reversal in orientation 
when looking at a drawing of the Necker cube ( Figure 3.2 ), it is also possible 
to experience a reversal in 3D orientation when looking at a cubical wire-
frame face-to-face (especially when one eye is shut). Another example is the 
phenomenon of binocular rivalry. In binocular rivalry, the image presented to 
the left eye is different than the image presented to the right eye, for example, 
an image of a face and an image of a house (Blake and Logothetis 2002; Alais 
and Blake 2015). In most cases, however, only one of these objects is visible at 
a time: the other is suppressed from visual awareness. 
 The important point is that when sources of optical information in 
real-world contexts are highly ambiguous, we do not experience different 
3D-scene interpretations at the same time. Instead, we  alternate between 
competing interpretations. In relevant cases, the visual system does not select 
a conjoint or ‘blended’ hypothesis concerning the distal causes of proximal 
sensory stimulation. We do not experience the cubical wireframe as having 
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two different orientations at the same time, nor do we experience a blending 
of the face and house. This makes good sense, from a Bayesian perspective, 
since conjoint hypotheses such as these have extremely low prior probabili-
ties (Hohwy  et al . 2008). 
 The Gombrichian, in short, can maintain that what holds when the infor-
mation in the light received from a real-world scene is equivocal—that is, 
when it does not support the selection of a single 3D-scene interpretation—
also holds when the information in the light from a patterned, pictorial 
surface is equivocal. The visual system, in both cases, switches between com-
peting interpretations that ‘fit’ the available sensory evidence. 10 It does not 
generate an experience that reflects both interpretations at the same time. 
 With respect to the second putative disanalogy, the Gombrichian can con-
cede that the two interpretations attribute properties to different objects, 
viz., the opaque, 2D pictorial surface ( I 1 ), on the one hand, and an object in 
phenomenally 3D pictorial space ( I 2 ), on the other. This doesn’t mean, how-
ever, that the two interpretations are consistent. On the contrary, there is 
a very straightforward reason to think that they are mutually exclusive:  I 1  
represents the presence an opaque, 2D surface  S in front of the perceiver, 
while  I 2 represents (non-veridically) an array of objects receding in depth 
behind  S . Human perceivers, however, do not have the capacity see through 
an opaque surface, for example, a sheet of canvas covered with paint, to 
the world on the other side. If a given solid angle  in the visual field appears 
to contain a non-transparent, 2D surface located at some distance in depth 
 D , then  it cannot, at the same time, also appear to contain an array of 3D 
objects at locations more distant in depth than  D . 
 3. The Seeing-In Theory 
 Richard Wollheim is a prominent critic of the Gombrichian account of pic-
torial experience (1963, 1987). According to Wollheim, when we look at a 
picture, we not only experience the organization of a virtual 3D scene; we 
also experience the design present on the 2D pictorial surface. In this sense, 
pictorial experience—or ‘seeing-in’, as Wollheim calls it—has two ‘aspects’ 
or two ‘folds’ of representational content: 
 Seeing-in is a natural capacity we have—it precedes pictures, though 
pictures foster it—which allows us, when confronted by certain dif-
ferentiated surfaces, to have experiences that possess a dual aspect, or 
‘twofoldness’, so that, on the one hand, we are aware of the differentia-
tion of the surface, and, on the other hand, we observe something in 
front of, or behind, something else. 
 (1993: 188) 
 Wollheim argues that while the two ‘folds’ of content in pictorial experi-
ence are clearly different, they are not, contrary to Gombrich, incompatible 
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(Wollheim 1963: 29). As paradoxical as it may sound, the same solid angle 
in the visual field, when we look at a picture, is represented twice over: once 
as encompassing an opaque, two-dimensionally organized surface and once 
as encompassing a (virtual) three-dimensionally organized scene. 
 Two different two ways of dispelling the appearance of paradox at the 
heart of the seeing-in theory have been proposed. The first appeals to the 
idea that pictorial space and physical space are experienced as entirely unre-
lated. Wollheim writes that ‘there are two distinct dimensions here along 
which “on,” “level with,” and “behind” are values: a physical dimension and 
what we might call a pictorial dimension’ (1974: 27). Hence, it would be a 
phenomenological mistake to describe pictorial experience as representing 
an opaque, 2D surface  in front of a 3D scene. This description conflates 
apparent physical and pictorial depth relations. 
 The problem with this suggestion is that pictorial space and physical space, 
while experienced as distinct, are not experienced as entirely unrelated (Hop-
kins 1998: 195–196; Kulvicki 2009; Lopes 2010). For one thing, objects in 
pictorial space not only appear to be positioned in certain directions relative 
to the pictorial point of view, they also appear to be positioned in certain 
directions relative to the viewing subject’s location in physical space. When 
you watch a film, Lopes notes, ‘there is a rich and systematic overlap in the 
two viewpoint-determining contents—that is, between the represented direc-
tions from the camera to depicted objects and directions the objects appear 
to lie in from the picture viewer in normal viewing conditions’ (Lopes 2010: 
76). In other words, we can be aware of the direction of an object in pictorial 
space in both picture- and observer-based frames of reference. 
 A second, related consideration has to do with the observation that objects 
in pictorial space sometimes seem to ‘follow’ the viewer (Gombrich 1972; 
Goldstein 1979; Koenderink  et al . 2004; Newall 2015). When the viewer 
moves in relation to the famous British Army recruiting poster depicting 
Lord Kitchener, for example, the virtual object she experiences in pictorial 
space curiously appears to rotate toward her (Gombrich 1961/2000: 113). 
Koenderink  et al . write: 
 Does this mean that the pictorial object ‘rotates along with the observer’ 
as the observer assumes a series of oblique viewing positions by walking 
along the painting on the wall? .!.!.  Yes in terms of the physical space 
containing the scene, picture, and observer: the pictorial object always 
squarely faces the observer, it thus looks or points into the observer’s 
visual direction. As the observer changes the visual direction with 
respect to the picture plane, the looking or pointing direction of the 
pictorial object in physical and visual space has to rotate with it. 
 (Koenderink  et al . 2004: 526) 
 The main point is that we not only experience the pictorial object’s constant 
orientation in pictorial space vis-à-vis the picture plane, we also experience 
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its orientation as changing vis-à-vis our own location in physical space. 
Together, these considerations (but see Kulvicki [2009] for others) suggest 
that the ‘disjoint space’ view fails to dispel the appearance of paradox at the 
heart of Wollheim’s account of pictorial experience. 
 John Kulvicki (2009) enlists our capacity to see through  transparent media 
in the service of an alternative account of how twofold pictorial experience 
is possible. In familiar cases of transparency perception, the visual system 
distributes light-altering properties, such as colour, transmittance, and glossi-
ness, to surfaces at different distances in depth along the same line of sight. 
This process, which results in a ‘layered’ representation of the distal scene, is 
known as  scission (Kanizsa 1979; Metelli 1970, 1974; Fleming and Anderson 
2004; Anderson and Winawer 2008). When such distribution is unnecessary 
either because the overlying layer is completely opaque or completely trans-
parent, scission does not occur. As the vision scientist Fabio Metelli writes, 
 [i]f all the color goes to the transparent layer, it becomes opaque. If 
all the color goes to the underlying surface, then the transparent layer 
becomes invisible. Transparency is perceived only when there is a dis-
tribution of the stimulus color to both the [overlying] layer and the 
[underlying] layer. 
 (1974: 94) 
 Kulvicki argues that human capacities for transparency perception allow 
for the possibility of twofold pictorial experience: the luminance intensi-
ties in the retinal image of a picture are used by the visual system to assign 
properties to the opaque, 2D pictorial surface and, at the same time, to 3D 
objects that appear to recede in depth behind the surface. It does not matter 
to this proposal, he says, that 
 this kind of layering typically happens when one is confronted with 
semitransparent objects.!.!.!. What matters is that the visual system has 
the resources for representing objects and qualities at different distances 
in one and the same direction, as the literature on transparency percep-
tion strongly suggests. 
 (2009: 393) 
 The basic problem with this proposal is that the process of scission 
involves the  distribution of light-altering properties to surfaces at differ-
ent distances in depth along the same line of sight. The fundamental ques-
tion for the visual system, as Fleming and Anderson put it, is, ‘How much 
of the light is due to reflectance of underlying surface, and how much is 
due to the properties of the overlying layer?’ (2004: 1294). However, if, by 
hypothesis, the pictorial surface is experienced as opaque in twofold picto-
rial experience (in ‘one and the same direction, at a given time, one sees two 
rather different opaque surfaces, one behind the other: the picture plane and 
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the receding content’ [Kulvicki 2009: 394]), then this just means that no 
such distribution of light-altering properties can have taken place. Instead 
of attenuating the paradox at the heart of Wollheim’s theory of pictorial 
experience, the proposal that twofoldness is made possible by our capacity 
to perceive through transparent media only aggravates it. 
 Proponents of the seeing-in theory have put forward several reasons to 
think that twofoldness, however paradoxical it may sound, is a necessary 
feature of pictorial experience. One reason, Wollheimians maintain, is that 
twofoldness is required for the aesthetic appreciation of pictures (Wollheim 
1980; Nanay 2010). If true, however, this would only entail that we experi-
ence certain art pictures in a twofold way, not that twofoldness is neces-
sary for pictorial experience in general (Lopes 1996: 48). More generally, it 
could also be argued that twofoldness isn’t even necessary for purposes of 
aesthetic evaluation. Why isn’t rapidly shifting attention between proper-
ties of the pattern on the pictorial surface, for example, the texture of the 
brushstrokes on a painting, and properties of the virtual object in pictorial 
space sufficient? 
 A second reason has to do with evidence that when a picture is viewed 
from an oblique angle, we do not experience objects in pictorial space as 
significantly distorted in shape. In other words, shape constancy in pictorial 
space obtains across changes in perspective. Wollheim argues the best expla-
nation of such constancy is that the viewer not only is aware of the object 
in pictorial space but also compensates for the orientation of the pictorial 
surface. Such compensation, he suggests, involves awareness of the ‘surface 
qualities of the representation’ (1980: 215–216). 
 There are three lines of response. First, as Lopes points out, even were 
it true that surface awareness is necessary for pictorial shape constancy, 
this wouldn’t entail that it is necessary for pictorial experience in general 
(1996: 49). Second, the compensation process could take place an entirely 
subpersonal level, using nonconscious information about the orientation of 
the pictorial surface: Wollheim provides no reason to suppose that compen-
sation depends on conscious perception of surface orientation. Third, there 
are alternative explanations of pictorial shape constancy in vision science. ‘A 
quite different (and also quite common) view,’ as the perceptual psycholo-
gist Jan Koenderink and co-authors write, 
 is that observers simply don’t care, that is to say, disregard (but not in 
any active sense) the distortions of the retinal image, since the monocular 
cues as to the structure of the pictorial space are rich enough anyway. 
In that case, a subsidiary awareness of the picture surface is irrelevant. 
 (Koenderink  et al . 2004: 515) 
 Summarizing the evidence, they conclude that ‘there appears to be some 
(weak) consensus that no “correction” is applied to pictorial space due to 
obliquely viewed pictures’ (Koenderink  et al . 2004:!526). 
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 According to the seeing-in theory, it is possible to experience the same 
solid angle in the visual field both as completely filled by an opaque, 2D 
surface at a single distance in depth  and as containing an array of 3D objects 
at different distances in depth. I have shown that two of the main attempts 
to render this view non-paradoxical confront serious objections, and this 
speaks in favour of the analogy Gombrich draws between pictorial experi-
ence and the experience of looking at an ambiguous figure like the duck–
rabbit. In both cases, we ‘can train ourselves to switch more rapidly, indeed 
to oscillate between readings, but we cannot hold conflicting interpreta-
tions’ (1961/2000: 236). 
 Before proceeding, however, I would like to make two additional points. 
First, Gombrich suggests that it is typically possible to alternate at will 
between awareness of the configuration of colours, textures, and marks on a 
2D pictorial surface and awareness of the properties and layout of objects in 
phenomenally 3D pictorial space, much as it is possible to alternate at will 
between the different ‘aspects’ of the Necker cube (Gombrich 1961/2000: 
236, 280). There are good reasons, however, to question the generality of 
this assumption. Whether such voluntary switching is possible when looking 
at a picture depends, among other things, on the range of depth cues in the 
light reflected from its surface to the eye. It is quite hard, in fact, to ‘unsee’ 
3D structure in line-drawings that contain appropriate T-junctions, linear 
perspective, and other depth cues under ordinary, binocular viewing condi-
tion (Kennedy 1974; Zeimbekis 2015). 11 It is even harder when standard, 
surface-specifying cues are eliminated. Looking at a painting through a nar-
row, monocular aperture often results in a robust impression of depth and 
‘stereopsis’, that is, solid form and immersive space (Kubovy 1986: ch.!12; 
see the next section). A similar effect is obtained when looking at a single 
picture through a zograscope (Koenderink  et al . 2013). 12 These devices 
eliminate cues that specify the presence and properties of the 2D pictorial 
surface and, so, render a Gombrichian switch effectively impossible. 
 Viewing distance also matters. As suggested by the epigraph from  Martin 
Eden , it may not be possible to enjoy an experience as of virtual depth and 
3D structure when viewing certain paintings at close range. 13 By contrast, it 
is exceedingly difficult to elude that experience when watching a film from 
the back row of a movie theater. 
 These considerations suggest that whether or not it is possible to perform 
a Gombrichian switch depends on both the sources of information in the 
light reflected from a pictorial surface as well as the conditions under which 
the surface is viewed. If this is right, however, then the real problem with 
Gombrich’s deployment of the duck-rabbit analogy, contrary to Wollheim, 
isn’t that it underestimates, but rather that it  overestimates our ability to see 
the superficial pattern on a picture’s surface as such. 
 The second point is that when a Gombrichian switch between competing 
interpretations of the retinal image of a picture  is possible, iconic and/or 
visual short-term memory of ‘pre-switch’ interpretations may support the 
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illusion of simultaneity. That is, instead of simply oscillating between an 
experience as of a pattern of brushstrokes on a 2D canvas ( I 1 ) and an expe-
rience as of an object or scene in phenomenally 3D pictorial space ( I 2 ), as 
Gombrich suggests, the viewer may oscillate between  I 1 + a sensory, visual 
memory of  I 2 and  I 2 + a sensory, visual memory of  I 1 . In consequence, she 
may deceptively seem to enjoy both visual experiences ( I 1 and  I 2 ) at once. 
Also at work may be a kind of “immanence” (Minsky 1986) or “refrigera-
tor light” illusion (Block 2001), in which the viewer mistakes the poten-
tial presence in visual consciousness of a certain set of properties for their 
actual presence. As an example of the refrigerator light illusion, here is 
Eric Schwitzgebel’s (2008) explanation of why naïve introspectors tend to 
overestimate their visual acuity outside the central, foveal region of their 
visual field: 
 Here’s the root of the mistake, I suspect: When the thought occurs to 
you to reflect on some part of your visual phenomenology, you nor-
mally move your eyes (or “foveate”) in that direction. Consequently, 
wherever you think to attend, within a certain range of natural foveal 
movement, you find the clarity and precision of foveal vision. It’s as 
though you look at your desk and ask yourself: Is the stapler clear? Yes. 
The pen? Yes. The artificial wood grain between them and the mouse 
pad? Yes—each time looking directly at the object in question—and 
then you conclude that they’re all clear simultaneously. 
 (Schwitzgebel 2008: 255; also see Dennett 1969: 139–140) 
 Similarly, I would suggest, our ability to switch attention without significant 
delay between the colours, textures, and other superficial properties visible 
within some pictorial surface region  R , on the one hand, and the properties 
of the virtual 3D object or scene displayed by  R , on the other, may contrib-
ute to the illusion that both sets of properties are present in visual conscious-
ness at the same time. 
 Consider in this connection the view that certain pictures elicit a two-
fold experience that Dominic Lopes refers to as ‘design seeing’ (2005: 28). 
When we engage in design seeing, according to Lopes, we see the configu-
ration of design features visible on a picture’s 2D surface as ‘undergirding’ 
or as ‘responsible for’ the very experience of depth and 3D structure that 
those features elicit in us. Pictures that elicit design seeing ‘wear the process 
of depiction on their sleeves’ (Lopes 2005: 52). This view is controversial, 
however, not only because it takes the possibility of twofoldness for granted 
but also because it presupposes that the contents of visual experience are 
rich enough to represent pictorial design features as such. That is, it pre-
supposes that visual experiences (and not only visually based beliefs) have 
capacity to represent the high-level property  pictorial design feature . 
 I do not want to take a stand here on the dispute between ‘rich’ and 
‘thin’ theories of visual representational content (but see Prinz 2006; Siegel 
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2010, 2016; Briscoe 2015; and Byrne 2016). For present purposes, the point 
is only that the visual-memory/attentional-switching proposal provides 
resources to explain why looking at a picture may sometimes deceptively 
appear to involve design seeing. Because, in relevant cases, we have the 
capacity to switch attention between the set of design features visible within 
some pictorial surface region  R and properties of the virtual, 3D object or 
scene displayed by  R and, in addition, because our experience of the design 
features visible within  R may be, so to speak, coloured by a concurrent, 
visual memory of that virtual object or scene, it may seem to us as though 
our experience of those design features represented them  as such —and not 
merely as a superficial configuration of marks, colours, textures, and other 
low-level properties. 
 4. Toward a Weakly Onefold Theory of Pictorial Experience 
 Dominic Lopes (1996) refers to the view that twofoldness is essential to pic-
torial experience as ‘strong twofoldness’ and, correspondingly, to the view 
that twofoldness is merely consistent with pictorial experience as ‘weak 
twofoldness’. Gombrich, by contrast, is sometimes interpreted as defend-
ing what might be called a  strongly onefold conception of pictorial experi-
ence. According to strong onefoldness, it is not psychologically possible to 
experience  any properties of the 2D pictorial surface while simultaneously 
experiencing properties of a virtual scene in phenomenally 3D pictorial 
space. To the extent that we are aware of virtual depth and 3D structure 
when viewing  The Peasant Wedding ( Figure 3.1 ), for example, we are effec-
tively blind to the superficial pattern on the painting’s canvas. 
 Strong onefoldness is a core component of the so-called illusion theory 
of pictorial experience. The illusion theory goes far beyond the claim that 
pictorial experience and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same 
psychological kind (the Continuity Hypothesis). It further maintains that 
pictures elicit experiences that cannot be introspectively distinguished from 
experiences of seeing the objects that they depict face-to-face. According 
to the illusion theory, Lopes writes, ‘one sees  O in a picture when and only 
when one’s experience as of  O when looking at the picture is phenomenally 
indistinguishable from a face-to-face experience of  O ’ (2005: 30). But, if the 
experience of looking at a picture of an object is supposed to be phenom-
enologically on all fours with the experience of seeing an object with the 
same properties face-to-face, then the former experience evidently cannot 
involve seeing the properties of the picture’s surface. Not surprisingly, the 
paradigm case of pictorial experience for the illusion theory is the experi-
ence of seeing a  trompe l’oeil painting from the appropriate station point. 
 The possibility of pictures that ‘fool the eye’ indicates that pictorial expe-
rience is, at least sometimes, strongly onefold. Putting  trompe l’oeil paint-
ings to the side, however, most pictures do not elicit experiences that are 
introspectively difficult to distinguish from experiences of actually seeing 
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their  depicta . As Gombrich points out, ‘we rarely get into situations in which 
the eye is actually deceived’ (1961/2000: 246). One reason is straightfor-
ward. When we look at a picture of some high-level kind of  F , for example, 
a woman, or a tree, or a clock, the properties attributed by our visual system 
to the object we experience are very often different from those that would be 
attributed to an actual  F , when seen from the relevant point of view. Indeed, 
the intentional object of our experience may appear to have properties that 
no actual  F could have (think of Magritte’s surrealist paintings) and/or to 
lack properties that no actual  F could lack (think of Picasso’s highly abstract 
line drawings). 
 These considerations present a serious challenge to the illusion theory, 
but they do not threaten the Continuity Hypothesis. That the content of 
the experience caused by a picture of a horse typically does not match the 
content of an experience that might have been caused by an actual horse 
does not conflict with the claim that they are experiences of the same psy-
chological kind. In this respect, after all, the experience elicited by a picture 
of a horse is completely on par with the experience of seeing a 3D sculpture 
or model of a horse in the flesh. 
 I have indicated one reason why pictorial experience is typically non-
deceptive: the properties attributed by pictorial experience to its intentional 
object are in many cases different from those that the depicted object would 
be seen to have when confronted face-to-face. There is a more profound 
respect, however, in which the experience elicited by a picture is normally 
distinguishable from the experience of actually seeing the object that it 
depicts. Robert Hopkins writes, 
 In some way, when I see a woman in a painting, I am visually aware of a 
woman.!.!.!. I am presented with a woman, but not so as to suggest that 
 that is what is really there. Unlike perceptual consciousness, this aware-
ness is non-committal about the reality of its objects. In this respect, if 
no other, pictorial consciousness is like visualizing. 
 (Hopkins 2012b: 434) 
 Similarly, Michael Martin observes that when we look at pictures, we expe-
rience objects that manifestly lack ‘solidity’ and a ‘self-standing appearance’. 
The objects of pictorial experience, in contrast with objects seen face-to-
face, are experienced as ‘ mere visibilia’ (Martin 2012: 342). Other authors 
in this connection refer to a feeling of ‘presence’ or ‘reality’ that accom-
panies seeing face-to-face but is conspicuously absent when looking at a 
picture (Sartre 1940/2004; Michotte 1960; Matthen 2005; Wiesing 2010). 
 That the experience elicited by a picture of an object and the experience 
of seeing the depicted object face-to-face do not typically match in content, 
as we saw, does not threaten the Continuity Hypothesis. That pictorial expe-
rience typically does not dispose us to believe that its intentional object is 
real—‘something out there’—by contrast, presents a serious challenge. As 
Gombrich and the Duck–Rabbit 73
Hopkins points out, if the claim that pictorial experience is an experience of 
the same psychological kind as the experience of seeing face-to-face is to be 
informative, then the respects in which former is phenomenally distinguish-
able from the latter must be limited to differences in the properties—the 
shapes, sizes, colours, and so forth—that they respectively attribute to their 
intentional objects: 
 The move from presenting [the intentional object]  O as real to no longer 
doing so hardly fits that bill. One central difference between seeming to 
see something and visualizing it is that the former necessarily presents 
its object as real. Failure to do that secures that [pictorial experience] 
cannot be [a] visual experience as of  O , and opens up the possibility 
that it is visualizing. 
 (Hopkins 2012a: 654–655) 
 These considerations not only put pressure on the illusion theory, they 
also put pressure on the Continuity Hypothesis. If everyday visual experi-
ence typically disposes its subject to believe that its intentional objects are 
real, but pictorial experience does not, then this is seemingly a good reason 
to suppose that we are dealing with experiences that not only contrast in 
representational content but also in psychological kind. 
 The remainder of this section has two aims. The first is to motivate an 
account of the structure of everyday, non-deceptive pictorial experience that 
I refer to as  weak onefoldness . Everyday pictorial experience, according to 
the account, is onefold in the sense that its content reflects a single, consistent 
3D-scene interpretation of the retinal image. It does not represent the same 
solid angle in the visual field twice over—once as filled by an opaque, two-
dimensionally organized surface and once as filled by a three-dimensionally 
organized scene. Everyday pictorial experience, however, typically is only 
 weakly onefold in the sense that it attributes properties to the pictorial sur-
face and to objects in pictorial space at the same time. It represents a single 
scene with both real and virtual constituents—a scene that straddles the 
boundary between physical and pictorial space. On this approach, surface 
representation in pictorial experience is not an all or nothing affair. Hav-
ing the experience as of virtual depth and 3D structure, when looking at 
a picture, I argue, excludes representing some, but not  all of its superficial 
properties. The important consequence, in the present context, is that is pos-
sible to embrace Gombrich’s requirement of a single, consistent, 3D-scene 
interpretation while rejecting strong onefoldness and the illusion theory. 
 The second aim is to reconcile the claim that pictorial experience and 
seeing face-to-face are psychologically continuous with the observation that 
the (virtual) objects of pictorial experience normally do not appear to be 
present in the physical environment. An empirically motivated account of 
 stereopsis developed by Dhanraj Vishwanath (2014), I argue, makes such 
reconciliation possible. 
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 In order to motivate weak onefoldness, it is necessary to demonstrate 
that although pictorial experience is structured by just one layer or ‘fold’ 
of representational content, that content can consistently attribute certain 
combinations of properties to the 2D pictorial surface and to objects in 
phenomenally 3D pictorial space at the same time. There are at least two 
different ways, I propose, in which this is possible. 
 First, while it may not be possible simultaneously to experience the same 
solid angle in the visual field as filled by an array of voluminous 3D objects 
that recede in depth  and by a single, non-transparent 2D surface, it does 
seem possible, when looking at a picture, to divide attention between the 
region of pictorial space contained within some solid visual angle  Ē and the 
distribution of pictorial surface properties contained within some different 
solid visual angle  ĳ . For example, we can divide our attention between the 
3D shape of an object displayed in one region of a canvas and the facture 
or colour of the paint laid down in some other. If so, then we may be visu-
ally aware of certain pictorial-space properties and certain pictorial-surface 
properties at the same time. None of the considerations adduced earlier in 
support of Gombrich’s account of pictorial experience rule out distributing 
our attention and the content of our experience across the pictorial space/
physical space frontier in this manner. 
 Second, it is possible to experience regions on a pictorial surface as opaque 
and as partially occluding objects in pictorial space. Words printed on a pic-
torial surface, for example, may be visually experienced as occluding figures 
on a more distant, three-dimensionally organized background, and when 
this is the case, we experience properties of the real-world surface and vir-
tual scene at the same time. Posters, movies with subtitles, advertisements, 
and other pictures that incorporate textual elements elicit experiences that 
plausibly fit this description. They provide an existence proof of the pos-
sibility of weakly onefold pictorial experience. 
 As an example, consider the poster for the Buster Keaton film  Sherlock, 
Jr . reproduced in  Figure 3.4 . Some edges, including those belonging to the 
letters in the title of the film are represented by the visual system as sur-
face events and, so, are assigned to locations on the pictorial surface. Other 
edges, in contrast, are assigned to locations beyond the surface in picto-
rial space. The contour of the virtual object resembling Keaton’s head, for 
example, appears to occlude the lowermost edges of some of the letters in 
the name ‘Keaton’, with the result that the entire name is dragged back in 
depth. It appears to float inside the virtual, 3D scene displayed by the poster, 
while the title  Sherlock, Jr . rests on the plane of the poster’s surface. Contra-
diction is avoided because no edge is interpreted in both ways at once. The 
overall experience elicited by the poster, I would suggest, is one in which 
certain textual elements appear partially to occlude objects that recede in 
depth from the plane of the pictorial surface. 
 There are constraints, of course, on which experienced combinations of 
2D surface properties and virtual, 3D scene properties are psychologically 
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possible. Consider once again a drawing of the Necker cube ( Figure 3.2 ). 
There are eight vertices or ‘y-junctions’ present in the retinal image of the 
drawing, each of which can be interpreted in at least three different ways: 
as convex, that is, pointing toward the viewer; as concave, that is, point-
ing away from the viewer; or as co-planar, that is, as the intersection of 
three line segments on the same plane of depth as the pictorial surface. Each 
local interpretation constrains how the visual system interprets the remain-
ing seven y-junctions in the image. Interpreting y-junction  a as convex, for 
instance, constrains the visual system to interpret  b ,  c ,  d as pointing in the 
same direction with the result that face  abcd is experienced as in front of 
face  efgh . Interpreting  a as concave results in the reverse depth ordering. 
Interpreting  a as co-planar with the pictorial surface results in a globally 
‘flat’ interpretation, in which neither  abcd nor  efgh is experienced as in front 
Figure 3.4 Poster for Sherlock, Jr. (1924)
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of the other. Each local interpretation, in short, constrains how the visual 
system interprets the other edges present in the retinal image (Albert and 
Hoffman 2000; Cooper 2008). For present purposes, the main point is that 
the visual system processes 3D structure in a holistic way. In the pictorial 
case, this means that whether a given edge in the retinal image is interpreted 
as an event on the 2D pictorial surface or as the contour of a (virtual) 3D 
object typically has consequences for how other nearby edges in the retinal 
image are interpreted. 
 I have argued the visual system can consistently attribute certain proper-
ties to the pictorial surface and to objects that appear beyond the surface in 
pictorial space at the same time. When it does, the experience elicited by a 
picture is weakly onefold. It represents a single, integrated scene containing 
both real and virtual elements. If this is right, however, then it possible to 
embrace the Continuity Hypothesis and Gombrich’s requirement of a single, 
consistent, 3D-scene-interpretation while rejecting strong onefoldness. 
 I turn, now, to the observation that pictorial experience does not typically 
dispose the viewer to believe that its intentional object is real, that is, present 
to sight in physical space. Does this observation, as Hopkins suggests, speak 
against the Continuity Hypothesis? 
 It is helpful to begin by reflecting on some of the very different reasons 
why visualizing and pictorial experience do not tempt the subject to believe 
that she is perceptually related to an object in the physical environment. 
The primary reason that visualizing is ‘non-committal’ about the real pres-
ence of its objects is that its content is subject to the will (Sartre 1940/2004; 
Wittgenstein 1953; McGinn 2004). 14 Visualizing, like thinking, is something 
we do, not something that happens to us. Accordingly, we do not adopt an 
attitude of  observation toward its intentional objects. This is not to deny 
that we can sometimes learn about the world by engaging in visualization: 
a subject, for example, could imagine what her flat would look like if all the 
walls in it were transparent and thereby come to realize for the first time 
that certain windows were opposite each other. 15 The right point is that the 
contents of visualization are either imported from the subject’s memory and 
belief systems (as when she imagines the layout of the flat) or derived from 
certain manipulations of that information (as when she counterfactually 
imagines that the walls in the flat are transparent). It is in this sense that the 
objects of visualization are ‘not in a position to feed new information into 
our cognitive system’ (McGinn 2004: 20). 
 The contents of pictorial experience in contrast with the contents of 
visualization are not in general subject to the will. And, like the experience 
of seeing face-to-face, the content of pictorial experience is systematically 
guided by the flow of information from the external environment. A pic-
torial surface will elicit an experience as of an object with a specific 3D 
shape ý, for instance, only if it reflects light to the eye of the same type 
as would elicit experience as of a ý-shaped object when reflected from a 
real-world scene. 16 ‘[P]erceiving depth in pictures and perceiving depth in 
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the real world’, as the psychologist James Cutting puts it, ‘are cut from the 
same informational cloth’ (2003: 236). Pictures, in short, can elicit experi-
ences containing genuinely novel, visual content. They can surprise us and 
invite what McGinn refers to as an attitude of cognitive openness. In this 
respect, experiencing an object with certain properties in pictorial space is 
fundamentally unlike visualizing an object with the same properties. None-
theless, pictorial experience doesn’t so much as tempt the perceiver to judge 
that its object is really there in front of her. Why is this the case? 
 In order to answer this question, it is necessary to begin by introducing 
two distinctions. First, following Vishwanath (2014), we need to distinguish 
between having the experience as of depth and 3D structure, on the one 
hand, and having the experience of  stereopsis (from the Greek for  solid 
and  appearance ), on the other. Both pictures and real-world scenes elicit the 
former experience. Vishwanath characterizes the experience of stereopsis, in 
contrast, as the ‘vivid impression of tangible solid form, immersive negative 
space and realness that obtains under certain viewing and stimulus condi-
tions’ (Vishwanath 2014: 153). Pictures, as already observed, typically elicit 
the former experience without eliciting the latter. When we look at  The 
Peasant Wedding , for example, we experience the layout of a complexly 
organized, 3D scene, but we are hardly disposed to judge that the objects we 
experience are really there in front us. 17 
 Second, it is also necessary to distinguish between the sources of  relative 
depth information and sources of  absolute distance information available to 
the visual system (Landy  et al . 1995; Banks  et al . 2011). Independently vari-
able sources of relative depth information include, but are not limited to, 
occlusion, texture gradients, shading, the kinetic depth effect, height in the 
visual field, and binocular disparity. These relative cues specify, among other 
things, depth ratios between objects in a visible scene, for example, that 
object  a is twice as far away as object  b , and simple ordinal relations, for 
example, that  a is behind  b but in front of  c . They do not, however, specify 
the absolute distance of an object from the eye in either conventional units 
such as meters or non-conventional units such as eye heights (Sedgwick 
1986; Bennett 2011). Sources of absolute or ‘metric’ distance information 
comprise motion parallax, defocus blur, and the oculomotor cues of conver-
gence and accommodation. In order to integrate these two different types of 
spatial information for purposes of representing the 3D layout of a visible 
scene, relative cues must be scaled or ‘promoted’ by absolute cues so that the 
depth values they provide are commensurate (Landy  et al . 1995: 392). For 
example, the convergence angle of the eyes is a source of absolute informa-
tion about fixation distance, which, when combined with an estimate of the 
intraocular separation, can be used to promote binocular disparity to an 
absolute distance cue. 18 
 According to what Vishwanath calls the  absolute depth scaling hypothesis 
(ADSH), the experience of stereopsis obtains under real-world, binocular view-
ing conditions because both sources of relative depth and absolute distance 
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information typically are available to the visual system. Only relative depth 
information, however, is typically available for objects in pictorial space, and 
this explains why pictorial experience is not accompanied by the impression 
of stereopsis: 
 When a picture is viewed binocularly, distance cues such as binocular 
convergence, vertical disparity and the accommodative state of the lens 
specify the distance of the visible picture surface, so there are no opti-
cal distance cues that specify the distance of pictorial objects. Pictorial 
depth cues, such as shading, perspective, and interposition, can specify 
the 3-D shape and relative layout of objects in the depicted scene, but 
without distance information, these cues cannot be scaled to derive 
absolute depth or size. 
 (Vishwanath 2014: 158–159) 
 A number of philosophers have observed that pictorial experience does 
not represent its objects as standing in fully determinate, egocentric spatial 
relations to the observer herself (Carroll 1996; Cohen and Meskin 2004; 
Matthen 2005; Nanay 2014). In consequence, although the observer may 
be aware of depth and detailed 3D structure when looking at a picture, 
the virtual scene it displays does not ordinarily appear to be a potential 
arena for performing visuomotor actions. The ADSH provides a psycho-
physical explanation of  why pictures are, as Cohen and Meskin (2004) 
put it, ‘spatially agnostic informants’: sources of absolute distance infor-
mation in the light received from a pictorial surface are assigned to the 
2D pictorial surface, rather than to objects located in phenomenally 3D 
pictorial space. 19 
 One source of evidence for the ADSH is its ability to explain why the expe-
rience of stereopsis is successfully induced when paintings, photographs, 
and other types of pictures are viewed with one eye through a peephole (for 
others, see Vishwanath 2014). Under these conditions, neither vergence nor 
disparity is available as a source of information for the absolute distance 
of the pictorial surface. Accommodation-based distance information, how-
ever, remains, and, in the absence of a visible pictorial surface, Vishwanath 
proposes, it is reassigned to objects in pictorial space, enabling the visual 
system to compute estimates of their absolute distance in depth and intrin-
sic size. The ADSH predicts that the reassignment of accommodation-based 
distance information to pictorial objects should make them appear to be 
relatively close to the observer—that is, as located at roughly the actual 
distance of the pictorial surface from the eye—and, hence, as smaller than 
the real-world objects they are intended to resemble. (Indeed, accommoda-
tion is an effective range-finder only for objects in nearby space [Cutting 
and Vishton 1995].) Subjective reports concerning the effects of monocular 
aperture viewing bear this prediction out (Vishwanath and Hibbard 2013). 
The cars and buildings in a photograph of a cityscape, when viewed through 
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a narrow peephole, often have the appearance of being miniaturized and 
toy-like. This experience is sometimes referred to as the ‘diorama effect’. 20 
 As Hopkins argues, the claim that pictorial experience and seeing face-to-
face are experiences of the same psychological kind is informative only if the 
respects in which the two experiences are phenomenally distinguishable are 
at the level of representational content: they must be limited to differences in 
attributed visual appearance properties. On Vishwanath’s account, however, 
the reason that pictorial experience does not dispose the observer to believe 
she is seeing a real object is that it fails to specify the object’s location at 
some absolutely scaled distance in depth. But, if this right, then the relevant 
contrast with seeing face-to-face is best understood as a difference at the 
level of representational content rather than a difference at the level of psy-
chological kind. Just as visual experiences can be more or less determinate 
with respect to properties such as shape, size, and colour (Tye 2003)—an 
object present in peripheral vision, for example, may be experienced as dark 
in colour or as elongated in shape but not as instantiating a specific dark 
colour or a specific elongated shape—they can also be more or less determi-
nate with respect to the distance of an object  vis-à-vis the observer herself. 
In the limit, conscious vision simply may not offer comment on an object’s 
absolute distance in depth. In short, if the ADSH is correct, then the fact that 
the objects of pictorial experience do not appear to be present in the same 
space as the surface in which they are displayed does not speak against the 
psychological continuity of pictorial experience with seeing face-to-face. 
 5. Conclusion 
 I will conclude this chapter with a speculative proposal. According to Gom-
brich’s exclusivity requirement, the content of visual experience always 
reflects a single, consistent, 3D-scene interpretation of the retinal image. In 
the last section, I argued that weakly onefold pictorial experiences satisfy 
the exclusivity requirement, and I developed this claim with two examples. 
 Here is a third possible way in which pictorial experience  could be weakly 
onefold. The ADSH maintains that, when we look at a picture, absolute 
distance in depth estimates are only computed for the picture’s surface. Con-
scious vision is silent when it comes to the absolute distance of an object 
positioned ‘beyond’ the surface in pictorial space. In this respect, the content 
of our experience when we look at a picture is significantly less determinate 
than the content of our experience when we engage in seeing face-to-face. 
Now, one way in which the experience elicited by a picture could repre-
sent the presence of the picture’s surface  and the configuration of objects 
in pictorial space within the same solid angle in the visual field at the same 
time would be if it also represented the surface in a highly indeterminate 
way, in particular, if it represented the viewer-relative absolute distance and 
orientation of the surface, as well as some of its intrinsic geometric proper-
ties (curvature, shape, size), but did not attribute any  colour properties to 
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it. Just as the visual system does not offer comment on the absolute dis-
tance of an object embedded in pictorial space—this explains why the object 
never appears closer to us when we move in its direction (Matthen 2005: 
316–317)—it may not offer comment on the colour(s) of the surface in 
which the object is displayed. 
 This description, I would suggest, phenomenologically fits the experience 
of looking at certain photographs and naturalistic paintings, especially at a 
distance, as well as the experience of watching movies. In ‘the normal case 
of watching a movie’, Colin McGinn writes, ‘we don’t focus our attention 
on [the] fleeting patterns of light—we, as it were, look right  through them’ 
(McGinn 2005: 17). But this does not mean that visual awareness of the 
surface drops out entirely. The colour properties we experience when we 
watch a movie are assigned by our visual system to virtual objects on the 
‘other side’ of the screen, but we are still aware of the screen’s presence and 
typically have no difficulty estimating its distance from us or its orientation. 
 This proposal is not as counterintuitive as it may sound. In a recent treat-
ment, Fiona Macpherson (2015) critically evaluates the traditional, Aris-
totelian view that visual experience as of an object necessarily represents 
the object’s colour(s). Drawing on evidence concerning tactile-visual sensory 
substitution, amodal completion, and type 2 blindsight, she argues that there 
is no good reason to deny that visual awareness of ‘pure distal form without 
colour’ is possible. Contrary to philosophical tradition, colour may not be a 
structural feature of object-representing visual experience. Certain cases of 
picture perception, if I am right, put another arrow in Macpherson’s quiver. 
 To be clear, I am not proposing that in relevant cases we experience the 
pictorial surface as transparent to the virtual 3D scene. Recall Metelli’s con-
straints on transparency perception: 
 If all the color goes to the transparent layer, it becomes opaque. If all the 
color goes to the underlying surface, then the transparent layer becomes 
invisible. Transparency is perceived only when there is a distribution of 
the stimulus color to both the [overlying] layer and the [underlying] layer. 
 (1974: 94) 
 In the experience that I am characterizing, however, there is no  distribution 
of colour across layers. Instead, all the colour goes to the underlying layer, 
that is, to the object (or array of objects) in pictorial space. But this does not 
entail that the pictorial surface is invisible, like a perfectly clear pane of glass. 
Instead, we may visually experience the surface in a highly indeterminate 
way: as present at some absolute distance in depth and as having such-and-
such orientation relative to our line of sight but not as having any colour 
properties of its own. If so, then there would be no inconsistency internal to 
an experience that represented  both the surface and (non-veridically) a 3D 
scene receding in depth behind it. 
 Michael Newall develops a similar view in a recent treatment. According 
to Newall, when we look at certain photographs, ‘ all the picture surface’s 
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visible properties are attributed to the subject matter and the viewer loses all 
visual awareness of the picture surface’ (2015: 144). His example involves 
the photographic image of a glass of milk that appears on the cover of some 
editions of the novel  A Clockwork Orange : 
 The milk is depicted by a white, or slightly grey, colour. Here my claim 
is that this colour is wholly attributed to the subject matter—the milk—
which appears as if a little behind the picture surface. While we have this 
experience, the picture surface appears as if it lacks all its colour proper-
ties. It appears, one might say, transparent to the point of invisibility. 
 (Newall 2015: 145) 
 We can, to be sure, also experience the white colour as belonging to the picto-
rial surface, Newall allows, but this requires a Gombrichian switch. 
 My proposal in this concluding section owes a lot to Newall’s discussion 
of this example. It differs from his own proposal, however, in that it denies 
that in relevant cases the pictorial surface is completely invisible. Instead, 
I claim that we may be aware of the surface but in an uncharacteristically 
indeterminate way: the surface may be represented as having a certain abso-
lute distance in depth and orientation, as well as certain intrinsic, geometric 
properties, but not as having any colour properties. This seems phenomeno-
logically more plausible than the claim that the surface is altogether absent 
from visual awareness since we can attend to the changing distance or ori-
entation of a photograph like the one discussed above, while simultaneously 
paying attention to the virtual 3D object or scene that it displays. 21 
 Notes 
 1. Two clarificatory remarks. First, there are many different types of pictures and 
any given picture can elicit many different types of mental states in its viewers. 
Philosophers of perception and vision scientists, however, are specifically inter-
ested in those pictures that elicit an experience as of depth and 3D structure (for 
a useful, interdisciplinary overview, see the essays collected in Hecht  et al . 2003). 
Accordingly, my focus is on pictures that do elicit this distinctive experience. 
Although I do not argue for the claim here, I think that they constitute a fairly 
unified artefactual kind. Second, the point of using the ‘experience as of’ locu-
tion is to bracket the question concerning whether the experience in question is 
veridical. A visual experience as of a ý-shaped object, for example, may be an 
experience in which the perceiver actually sees a ý-shaped object or an experi-
ence in which she only  seems to see a ý-shaped object. 
 2. There are ways of developing Walton’s imagining seeing account on which it is 
an elaboration of (A). Looking at Kasimir Malevich’s  Suprematist Painting , for 
example, may elicit a non-veridical visual experience  as of a yellow rectangle 
in front of a green rectangle in front of a black trapezoid, which, in turn, may 
prompt the viewer to imagine that she is actually seeing a three-dimensionally 
organized scene with the properties represented in the former non-imaginative 
experience (Walton 1990: 56). In this sort of case, the content of the experience 
of imagining seeing is asymmetrically dependent on the content of an experience 
of the type described in (A). 
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 3. What about Escher lithographs such as  Belvedere , the  Devil’s Tuning Fork , and 
other ‘impossible figures’? These images display 3D structures with locally con-
sistent parts that are assembled in a globally inconsistent way. It is far from clear, 
however, that we visually experience the global inconsistency of an impossible fig-
ure  as such . Instead, we may see  that the building depicted by Escher’s  Belvedere 
is impossible—in Dretske’s (1969) epistemic sense of ‘seeing that’—by serially 
inspecting its locally consistent parts and drawing the conclusion that they can-
not be coherently assembled (Gombrich 1978; Bayne 2010: 54–55). Julian Hoch-
berg’s work is especially helpful here (see the essays and commentaries collected 
in Peterson  et al . [2007]). According to Hochberg, locally consistent regions of an 
impossible figure registered across multiple fixations are not normally compared 
to each other directly. Instead, we notice global inconsistencies when the internal 
model or ‘schema’ of the virtual object’s 3D structure set up by the depth cues 
available in one region of the picture is found to conflict with information about 
the object’s structure available in some other subsequently fixated region. In keep-
ing with this account, perceivers are much more likely to experience an impossible 
figure as a flat 2D form when globally inconsistent regions are close enough on 
the pictorial surface to be compared at a single glance. 
 4. Hatfield (1990) and Smith (2000) provide helpful historical overviews. 
 5. Compare Hume’s claim that ‘all bodies, which discover themselves to the eye 
appear as if painted on a plain surface’ (1740/1978: 56). 
 6. Although multistable perceptual experiences, as we have seen, can occur in which 
the selected hypothesis alternates from one moment to the next, depending on the 
allocation of attention and other factors. A clear example here is the flip in depth 
assignments when viewing a drawing of the Necker cube ( Figure 3.2 ). 
 7. The affinities described in this paragraph are no accident: Gombrich cites as 
major influences on his account of pictorial experience Tolman and Brunswik’s 
‘The Organism and the Causal Texture of the Environment’ (1935) and Hayek’s 
 The Sensory Order (1952), both of which anticipate ideas central to the Bayes-
ian approach. 
 8. An online demonstration is available here: www.lottolab.org. 
 9. Might consciously experiencing the chromatic properties instantiated by a pic-
ture’s surface nonetheless have epistemic or computational priority relative to 
perceiving the way chromatic properties appear to be distributed in pictorial 
space? Recent metacontrast-masked priming experiments conducted by Liam 
Norman and colleagues (2014) provide empirical evidence that speaks against 
this assessment. 
 10. This is not to deny, of course, that it is usually possible to falsify one (or more) 
of these interpretations through movement and active exploration in real-world 
cases (Gombrich 1961/2000: 274–275), that is, by ‘sculpting the flow’ of incom-
ing information from the environment (Clark 2015: ch. 4.) 
 11. ‘Everyone knows’, Wittgenstein remarks, ‘that a cube which is clearly drawn will 
be seen three-dimensionally. One might not even be able to describe what one 
sees in anything other than three-dimensional terms’ (1980: 85). 
 12. This is sometimes referred to as paradoxical monocular stereoscopy (Schlosberg 
1941; Koenderink  et al . 1994; Koenderink  et al . 2013). 
 13. Compare Kenneth Clark’s story about ‘stalking’ Velázquez’s painting  Las Meni-
nas , discussed in the introduction to  Art and Illusion (Gombrich 1961/2000: 6). 
 14. This is not to claim that visual imagining in general is subject to the will. See 
Briscoe (Forthcoming) for discussion. 
 15. I am grateful to Fiona Macpherson for this example. 
 16. Many different token light arrays, it should be emphasized, can convey opti-
cal information about the same spatial attribute. The arrays of light respectively 
reflected from a cubical wire framework seen face-to-face, a photograph of 
the framework, and a line drawing of the framework, for example, can convey 
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substantially the same information about 3D shape and orientation despite the 
numerous photometric differences between them (Gibson 1979; Kennedy 1974). 
 17. Stereopsis is often taken to require (or even to be identical with) the computa-
tion of depth from binocular disparities. Vishwanath points out that this is an 
error since the experience of stereopsis can be readily induced under monocular 
viewing conditions: when you close one eye, objects in front of you do not seem 
to be less real or ‘out there’. 
 18. There is significant debate when it comes to specifying the  units in terms of 
which visual experience ‘measures’ absolute distance and size. Robert Schwartz 
writes: ‘It has long been recognized that the pictorial cues cannot indicate abso-
lute spatial measures.!.!.!. Of the traditional cues only the nonvisual motor cues 
of convergence and accommodation might seem to vary directly and unambigu-
ously with distance.! .! .! . Still, in order to evaluate absolute distance it is not 
enough to have a cue  K that varies directly and unambiguously with distance. 
In addition, we need a scheme for assigning absolute-distance meaning to the 
values of  K . We must know how much distance goes with so much  K ’ (Schwartz 
2006: 23–24). One empirically well-motivated view is that visual experience 
represents absolute distance in terms of the height of the perceiver’s point of 
view from the ground plane, that is, in eye-height units. For discussion, see Ben-
nett (2011), Firestone (2013), and Briscoe (2015). 
 19. Several philosophers including Mohan Matthen (2005: ch. 13) and Bence Nanay 
(2010, 2014) have proposed that objects in pictorial space are represented by 
the ventral visual information processing stream in the brain, but are not nor-
mally represented by the action-guiding, dorsal processing stream. This, they 
argue, explains why the ‘feeling of presence’ does not typically attend picto-
rial experience. The ADSH should be distinguished from the Matthen-Nanay 
proposal. That absolute distance information required for programming motor 
actions is not available for the objects of ordinary, non-deceptive pictorial expe-
rience, does not entail that the dorsal stream is completely blind to depth and 
3D structure in pictorial space (see Briscoe 2016). 
 20. As Kubovy (1986) points out, however, depth of field is inversely proportional 
to peephole size. In consequence, a picture seen through a very narrow aperture 
‘would be nicely in focus even if the eye accommodated so that its focus plane 
would be at the distance one might expect the walls of a real room to be’ (1986: 
36). If this is right, then the reassignment of accommodation-based distance 
information to objects in pictorial space, under peephole viewing conditions, 
may place them at locations significantly further away from the perceiver than 
the actual location of the 2D pictorial surface. The location of a peephole rela-
tive to the pictorial surface and to the physical ground plane also matters. In her 
study of 17th-century Dutch perspective boxes, Susan Koslow writes, ‘One of 
the most surprising effects of a perspective box according to Samuel van Hoog-
straten was that a figure only a finger’s length appeared as large as life. This 
illusion was achieved because the figure was viewed from its own eye-level. As 
a consequence, the spectator felt himself included within the projected space of 
the perspective box’ (Koslow 1967: 38). 
 21. I am grateful to David Bennett, Derek Brown, Clotilde Calabi, E.J. Green, Fiona 
Macpherson, Lisa Mosier, Paul Noordhof, Paolo Spinicci, Tom Stoneham, and 
Alberto Voltolini for helpful discussions of the ideas presented in this chapter. 
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